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Abstract 
The work force in transition countries might be a lot more risk averse than the work 
force in a “normal” developing country where uncertainty has been a way of life for 
generations  for  all  but  the  most  privileged  strata.  In  contrast,  most  of  the  older 
workers are used to total security provided by the state and might be very reluctant to 
engage in unsure self-employment in the informal sector for example. One crucial 
point  of  the  research  is  to  relate  demographic  characteristics  like  age,  gender, 
educational attainment to risk attitudes that in turn will be linked to the incidence of 
informal or formal employment. A second important area as far as behavior patterns 
are concerned that might impact on informality are time preferences of workers. Here 
we  would  expect  that  many  workers  have  very  high  discount  rates  since  they 
experienced terrible turmoil in their lives during the first decade of the transition (this 
is especially true in countries of the former Soviet Union). Such high discount rates 
can  have  different  implications  for  choosing  informality  or  formality.  On  the  one 
hand, workers might discard benefits that are in a distant future (e.g., pension benefits 
accruing  in  formal  employment),  and  thus  more  willing  to  take  up  informal 
employment that might be associated with higher net wages. On the other hand, if, 
e.g., the fruits of being engaged in informal self-employment can be reaped only in a 
somewhat distant future, workers might prefer formal employment as it guarantees a 
certain  wage  now  even  if  over  a  longer  time  period  income  from  informal  self-
employment is higher. 
Preliminary  findings  from  the  Ukrainian  Longitudinal  Monitoring  Survey  (2007) 
suggest that general risk and career risk attitudes are important determinants of being 
in  the  informal  labor  market  while  measures  on  time  preferences  do  not  yield 
significant results.  
JEL codes: J24, O17, P20 
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I. Introduction 
 
There  exists  a  large  literature  on  the  informal  economy  and  labor  market 
segmentation along the formal-informal divide in developing countries. However, no 
studies exist that investigate the link between risk attitudes and time preferences of 
economic agents and the incidence of informality.  This paper is a first attempt to 
establish such a link employing a unique panel data set of the Ukrainian labor market, 
the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS).  In this paper we use the 
three available waves of the ULMS, collected in the years 2003, 2004 and 2007. The 
2007 wave has a special module on risk attitudes and time preferences, which is used 
for the analysis. Our study, apart from looking at the link between risk attitudes/time 
preferences and informality, also contributes to the small but growing literature on 
informal employment in transition countries. 
  To better understand the contribution of our study it is important to briefly 
look at the competing paradigms in the literature on labor market segmentation and 
informality. The existence of the informal segment of the labor market alongside the 
formal  sector  and  the  reasons  posited  for  its  existence  have  given  rise  to  several 
paradigms  in  the  literature.  One  key  question  in  the  labor  market  literature  for 
developing  countries  is  whether  informal  employment  or  self-employment  reflects 
voluntary choice or is involuntary due to segmentation in the labor market (Guasch 
1999). 
The traditional dualistic view, based on Harris and Todaro (1970), sees the 
informal segment as the inferior sector, the option of last resort. Due to barriers to 
entry,  minimum  wages,  unions  or  other  sources  of  segmentation,  formal  jobs  are 
rationed.  Workers  in  the  informal  sector  are  crowded  out  from  the  formal  sector 
involuntarily, their wage being less than that in the formal sector. For example, an 
increase in the statutory wage in the formal sector will reduce formal employment but   3 
lead to a lower informal wage and higher informal employment. During a recession 
informal employment and output expands because formal  employment is reduced, 
while  the  informal  labor  market  clears.  In  this  view  labor  market  segmentation 
between formality and informality is the defining feature of the labor market. 
In contrast, in a competitive labor market one would expect workers to be able 
to move freely between occupations, and for wages (broadly interpreted) to equalize 
accordingly. In this view the informal and informal labor markets are not segmented, 
but integrated. Voluntary choice regarding jobs and particular attributes of these jobs, 
such as flexible hours, working as a self-employed and being one’s own boss as a 
micro-entrepreneur, and not valuing social security benefits, can be the reasons for 
remaining in or moving to the informal sector (Maloney 1999, 2004; Cunningham and 
Maloney  2001).    Here,  contrary  to  the  segmentation  case,  formal  and  informal 
employment are not necessarily negatively correlated over the business cycle.  
Segmentation and integration of the formal and informal labor market are two 
very distinct perspectives on the interaction of formality and informality. Still, it is 
possible, given the heterogeneity of the informal labor market, that these features co-
exist in the same labor market. Fields (1990) subdivides the informal sector of the 
labor market into two categories: an ‘easy-entry’ informal sector, which constitutes 
the involuntary segment, and an ‘upper-tier’ informal sector, in which participation is 
voluntary. Hence, the labor market is divided into the formal sector, a ‘disadvantaged’ 
subsistence-level  informal  sector  and  the  ‘small  firm’  and  micro-entrepreneur 
informal sector.  
  Empirical evidence on informality in transition economies is currently sparse. 
In a study comparing Latin American countries and transition economies a wage gap 
for formal versus informal salaried jobs is found in the Latin American context but   4 
not  for  the  transition  economies  (Pages  and  Stampini  2007).
1  High  mobility  from 
informal to formal jobs is found in all countries, which suggests a preference and 
choice for formal work. For the case of self-employment and formal salaried work 
they find no clear pattern in the wage gap in terms of significance or sign and very 
low mobility between the two labor market sectors. Assessing labor mobility during 
economic transition, a study on Georgia finds support for labor market segmentation 
for  both  formal  and  informal  wage  employees  and  some  self-employed.  Formal 
employment is preferred over informal work, which also serves as buffer in recessions 
(Bernabe and Stampini 2008). A high degree of mobility between sectors alongside a 
significant  formal-informal  wage  gap  highlights  a  potential  case  of  labor  market 
segmentation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Krstic and Sanfey 2007). In the study by 
Lehmann  and  Pignatti  (2007)  the  role  of  the  informal  sector  in  labor  market 
adjustment in Ukraine is assessed, using the 2003 and 2004 waves of the ULMS. 
Their evidence supports the notion of labor market segmentation for wage employees, 
and the informal sector is found to be split into two tiers, with an upper-tier voluntary 
in the sector and the majority in the involuntary lower-tier.
2  
  When assessing the issue of whether workers select themselves into informal 
employment  relationships,  their  risk  attitudes  and  time  preferences  might  be 
particularly important determinants of informality in a transition context. A priori one 
might moot that the work force in transition countries is a lot more risk averse than 
the work force in a “regular” developing country where uncertainty has been a way of 
life for generations for all but the most privileged strata. In contrast, most of the older 
workers in transition countries are used to total security provided by the state and 
might, for example, be very reluctant to engage in unsure self-employment in the 
                                                 
1 Latin America: Argentina, Mexico, Venzuela; Transition Economies: Albania, Georgia, Ukraine. 
2Another study of the informal economy in Ukraine finds a formal-informal wage gap (Commander, 
Isachenkova and Rodionova 2008). 
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informal sector. Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) provide some preliminary evidence of 
this reluctance on the part of older workers.  
A  second  important  area  that  might  impact  on  informality  is  the  time 
preferences  of  workers.  Here  we  would  expect  that  many  workers  in  transition 
countries have very high discount rates since they experienced terrible turmoil in their 
lives during the first decade of the transition (this is especially true in countries of the 
former Soviet Union). Such high discount rates can have different implications as far 
as choosing informality or formality is concerned. On the one hand, workers might 
discard benefits that are in a distant future (e.g., pension benefits accruing in formal 
employment), and thus be more willing to take up informal employment that might be 
associated  with  higher  net  wages.  On  the  other  hand,  if,  e.g.,  the  fruits  of  being 
engaged  in  informal  self-employment  can  be  reaped  only  in  a  somewhat  distant 
future, workers might prefer formal employment as it guarantees a certain wage now 
even if over a longer time period income from informal self-employment is higher. 
  Given the large macro shocks that occurred in the first decade of transition and 
the relatively muted response of the labor market in CIS countries (Boeri and Terrell 
2002), we can treat the observed risk attitudes and time preferences as exogeneous 
factors impacting on the choice workers make regarding the formal-informal divide. 
In other words, in CIS labor markets, it is not working in the informal sector that 
determines risk attitudes and time preferences (as might be the case in a “regular” 
developing country) but risk attitudes and time preferences that determine whether a 
worker  decides  to  work  as  a  salaried  employed,  informally  or  formally,  or  as  an 
informal  or  formal  self-employed.  Thus  our  analysis  of  risk  attitudes  and  time 
preferences and their effects on the incidence of informality in a labor market of the 
CIS can be considered in a context where we have a quasi-natural experiment.   6 
The next section discusses the ULMS data set, definitional issues related to 
informality,  and  the  module  on  risk  attitudes  and  time  preferences.  Section  III 
discusses  which  predictions  regarding  the  impact  of  risk  attitudes  and  time 
preferences on informality are consistent with the various paradigms that we have 
briefly  sketched  above.  This  is  followed  by  the  presentation  of  our  results:  the 
unconditional correlations of our risk measures with demographic characteristics and 
with types of employment, the determinants of the incidence of informal employment 
in  probit  and  multinomial  logit  regressions  that  include  covariates  modeling  risk 
attitudes and time preferences as well as the determinants of flows between various 
employment states [needs to be still done].  A final section offers some conclusions.  
 
II. Data, Definitions and Measurement Issues 
 
Our principal source of information is the ULMS, a nationally representative survey 
of the Ukrainian work force, undertaken for the first time in the spring of 2003, when 
it was comprised of around 4,000 households and approximately 8,500 individuals. 
The second wave was administered between May and July of 2004, when sample 
sizes fell to 3,397 and 7,200 respectively. Data of the third wave were collected in 
2007  with  3101  questionnaires  of  households  and  6774  individual  questionnaires 
filled out. In the first part of our study we concentrate on the 2007 data but will extend 
our work by using the panel element of the data for the years 2003, 2004 and 2007.  
  The household questionnaire contains items on the demographic structure of 
the household, its income and expenditure patterns together with living conditions. 
The  core  of  the  survey  is  the  individual  questionnaire,  which  elicits  detailed 
information  concerning  the  labor  market  experience  of  Ukrainian  workers.  In  the 
2003  questionnaire,  besides  the  reference  week  sections,  there  is  an  extensive 
retrospective  part,  which  ascertains  each  individual’s  labor  market  circumstances   7 
beginning at specific points in time, namely December 1986, December 1991 and 
December 1997. The first two points are chosen to minimize recall bias, since the first 
date is close to the Chernobyl incident and the second date marks the end of the 
Soviet Union.  The respective module is then structured in such a way that the data 
record the month and year of every labor market transition or change in circumstance 
between December 1997 and the date of interview. The surveys for 2004 and 2007 
have a similar retrospective part covering the intervals 2003 to 2004 and 2004 to 
2007.  
  The definition of informality is a very complex issue as nicely exposited, for 
example, in chapter 1 of World Bank (2007) and in Kanbur (2009). We concentrate in 
this study on the “social protection/legalistic” definition since we find that using the 
“productivity-based”  concept  that  defines  informal  or  formal  sectors  would  in 
transition countries be rather misleading. For example, to take all self-employed or 
workers in micro firms as belonging to the informal sector might be appropriate in a 
developing country but will introduce large measurement error in transition countries 
(see Lehmann and Pignatti, 2007, for discussion of Ukraine on this issue). As pointed 
out by Kanbur (2009), it is vital to be clear what is meant by informality and stick to 
the  criterion  one  has  chosen.  We,  therefore,  use  the  information  we  have  for  the 
reference  weeks  and  define  an  employment  relationship  as  formal  if  employees 
answer the following question by choosing option 1, informal if they choose option 2: 
Tell me, please, are you officially registered at this job, that is on a work 
Roster, work agreement or contract? 
1.  Registered  2. Not Registered. 
 
For the self-employed we use a similar question: 
Is your activity registered? 
1. Yes  2. No 
   8 
We consider all self-employed giving option 1 as formal, while those answering No 
are considered informal. The self-employed decide for themselves whether to register 
their activity or not. We, therefore, think of all informal self-employed as voluntary 
informal self-employed. For employees we elicit the additional information about the 
(in-) voluntary nature of their informal job by asking the following question:  
Why are you not officially registered at this job? 
1.  Employer does not want to register. 
2.  I do not want to register. 
3.  Both. 
 
Answer 1 classifies a person as involuntary informal employed, answers 2 and/or 3 as 
voluntary informal employed.  
  With  registration,  salaried  workers  acquire  several  fringe  benefits,  pension 
rights as well as substantial job security, the latter at least on paper. We should note 
that workers might be employed in the formal sector, i.e. in a registered firm, but that 
their job might not be registered. In other words, we identify an informal employment 
relationship and not necessarily employment in the informal sector. As far as self-
employment is concerned, there exist countervailing reasons for registration or non-
registration of activities by the self-employed in Ukraine. On the one hand, registering 
one’s activity as self-employed one has to pay only a monthly flat tax, which amounts 
to approximately the equivalent of 60 US dollars; so on purely economic grounds 
registration is clearly not expensive and is beneficial. On the other hand, many might 
shy away from registration in order to avoid becoming the victim of corruption by 
state officials or worse.  
  On our measure we calculate an incidence of informality of roughly 15% that 
includes informal employees and informal self-employed. However, we need to stress 
that  our  definition  of  informality  does  not  capture  all  activities  in  the  shadow 
economy, but only informal employment relationships in the primary job.  In addition,   9 
in  Ukraine,  like  in  many  successor  states  of  the  Soviet  Union,  the  assessment  of 
informality is complicated by the fact that many firms pay a large part of workers’ 
salaries as undeclared “envelope payments” even if their workers have a formal job.  
How to treat workers in registered jobs who receive a substantial fraction of their 
salaries  off  the  books  is  a  contentious  issue.  Empirically,  we  can  only  solicit 
information  on  total  wages,  but  cannot  distinguish  between  the  “official”  and 
“unofficial” parts of wage payments. Workers in formal employment relationships 
are,  therefore,  treated  as  formally  employed  salaried  workers,  even  if  they  might 
receive  part  of  their  wages  in  an  informal  fashion.  Lehmann  and  Pignatti  (2007) 
provide a more detailed discussion of the ambiguous nature of informality in a CIS 
labor market. We attempt to overcome this ambiguity here by exclusively relying on 
the  definition  of  a  registered  job  as  a  formal  employment  relationship,  and  of  a 
registered activity of a self-employed person as formal self-employment. 
  We use two risk measures, a general risk measure and a measure related to 
career choices. Information on the first measure is collected by posing the following 
question:  
How do you see yourself? Are you generally a person who is fully willing to take 
risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please give a number from 0 to 10, 
where the value 0 means: “Completely unwilling to take risks” and the value 10 
means “Completely willing to take risks”. You can take the values in between to 
make your estimate. 
 
 Dohmen et al. (2005) have provided evidence on the experimental validity of this 
question. The validity of the risk questions have also been shown with the 2004 wave 
of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) (Bonin et al. 2007; Caliendo et al. 
2008).  The  career  related  risk  measure  was  calculated  using  the  answers  to  the 
following question: 
People can behave differently in different situations. How would you rate your 
willingness to take risks in career matters? (0 to 10 as before). 
   10 
To  receive  information  on  workers’  time  preferences  in  Ukraine  we  posed  the 
following hypothetical question:  
Imagine that you were offered to receive 1000 Hryvnias today or 1200 Hryvnias 
in a year from now. What would you prefer? (1) 1000 today (2) 1200 a year from 
now. 
 A person answering (1) was given in subsequent questions delayed amounts of 1400, 
1600, 1800 and 2000 Hryvnias.
3 As we shall see below, the attempt to elicit enough 
information about Ukrainian workers’ time preferences by posing this simple question 
was not very successful since a large majority of workers voted for immediate receipt 
even when offered an interest rate of 100% for the willingness to delay the receipt by 
one year. Estimates of time preference based on simple “choice tasks” of this form 
suffer from a variety of weaknesses (Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2002). 
For example, if the individuals’ utility function is concave (there is risk aversion) the 
inferred  time  preference  is  biased  upward  (time  preference  is  conflated  with 
diminishing  marginal  utility).  Also,  there  is  evidence  that  recent  experience  of 
economic uncertainty and inflation can result in replies that undervalue future rewards 
even  if  the  questions  abstracted  from  these  concerns,  a  consideration  certainly 
relevant for the Ukrainian economy in transition. These caveats need to be kept in 
mind during the discussion of the impact of time preferences on the incidence of 
informality. 
 
III. Competing paradigms on informality and risk attitudes 
 
To be completed…. 
IV. Results 
                                                 
3 In 2007 1000 Hryvnias amounted to roughly 200 US$, a non-trivial amount given that the average 
monthly wage was roughly XXX US$.    11 
IV.1 Risk measures, employment categories and demographic characteristics – a 
descriptive analysis 
Most members of the Ukrainian workforce are very reluctant to take risks in general 
as Figure 1 demonstrates. The modal for all respondents is at the value 0, with 20% of 
all respondents not willing to take any risk, while the second highest frequency is 
found at value 5. If we take values above 5 as an indication of the propensity to take 
risks  in  general,  then  we  find  roughly  20%  of  Ukrainian  workers  to  have  this 
disposition.  In  comparison,  Dohmen  et  al.  (2005)  find  the  German  workforce 
somewhat more prone to take risks in general since they locate about 30% of German 
workers as willing to take on risks in general. What is particularly striking in this 
comparison is the fact that the modal in the German case is at the value 5 (with 
roughly 22% of the respondents) and that those German workers not willing to take 
any risks amounts only to about 8%, i.e. the Ukrainian distribution is much more 
skewed  towards  non-risk  takers  than  is  the  German  distribution.  The  Ukrainian 
sample exhibits typical behavior for a transition economy that has faced several major 
upheavals over the last fifteen years.  
  The  distribution  of  the  general  risk  measure  when  calculated  only  for  the 
employed is, however, different as figure 2 shows. Having derived the measure for 
three employment categories, we see that for the informal and formal employees as 
well as for the self-employed the modal value is 5. We can also clearly infer from the 
figure that formal employees are more risk averse than the other two categories and 
that the self-employed are most willing to engage in risky activities. When we splice 
the data along the formal-informal divide, we see more mass at higher values of the 
general  risk  measure  for  informal  than  for  formal  workers  (figure  3).  A  similar 
relationship  holds  when  we  split  informal  employees  into  their  voluntary  and 
involuntary segments (figure 4).     12 
  Table 1 gives averages of the general risk measure for informal employees, 
formal employees and the self-employed by demographic characteristics and region. 
Inspection of these averages drives the point home that formal employees are less 
willing to take risks compared with the other two employment categories no matter 
what correlate we look at. Looking inside the sets of demographic characteristics we 
see that men are more willing to take risks as are younger workers and workers with 
university  education.  The  higher  propensity  to  take  risks  for  these  groups  holds 
independently of the employment category. On the other hand, among the informal 
employees those who are married and have children have a far lower willingness to 
take general risks. It is also striking that informal employees residing in Kiev have a 
substantially  higher  propensity  to  take  risks.  For  the  other  employment  categories 
region is not associated with differing risk attitudes. Finally those who are voluntarily 
informal employees making up about one third of all informal employees profess a 
larger  tendency  to  take  risks  than  the  involuntarily  informal  employees,  i.e.  those 
among the informal employees whose jobs are not registered even though they would 
prefer registration. It is also striking that the self-employed who register their activity 
have a slightly higher propensity to take risks than the non-registered (informal) self-
employed. 
  Thus far we have only looked at a general risk measure, but in our context it 
might be also fruitful to see the willingness of workers to take risks in career matters. 
A  comparison  of  figures  5  and  1  makes  clear  that  the  Ukrainian  workforce  is 
particularly  risk  averse  when  it  comes  to  career  choices.  The  modal  at  value  0, 
reaching about 27%, is nearly twice as large as the next largest frequency that occurs 
at value 5. The rest of the distribution is very similar to the distribution of the general 
risk measure. Consequently, the more conservative stance in career matters comes   13 
about because some respondents seem to shift their answers from a professed average 
risk attitude to a response that implies an absolute unwillingness to take risks.  
  In contrast to the general risk measure where the modal was at value 5 when 
looking at the three employment categories, for the formal employees and the self-
employed the modal of the career risk measure is at value 0; only with the informal 
employees do we see the highest frequency at value 5 (figure 6). As is the case with 
the willingness to take risks in general, formal employees are more conservative than 
their counterparts among informal employees and among the self-employed. When 
combining all formal and informal workers into two subsets, we get the same result 
that we had with the general risk measure: formal workers are far more risk averse 
than informal workers (figure 7). 
  The overall averages of the career risk measures shown for three employment 
categories in table 2 are about half a point smaller than the averages of the general 
risk measures in table 1. Otherwise, for the various demographic characteristics and 
regions we see the same relative risk patterns as in table 1. The larger propensity to 
take  risks  of  voluntary  informal  employees  and  of  formal  self-employed  is  also 
confirmed when risk taking is about career choices.  
  Figure 8 shows the time preferences of the respondents in our sample as we 
plot the fractions of those who are willing to delay receipt of 1000 hryvnias in return 
for an annual interest ranging between 20 and 100 percent. It is immediately obvious 
from the figure that 70% of respondents are only interested in immediate consumption 
no matter what the interest rate offered. As mentioned above, given the hazardous 
experience of many persons living in Ukraine in the nineties, our questions eliciting 
information on time preferences might have been too simple to counter the strong bias 
that  exists  for  immediate  consumption.  At  any  rate,  for  the  sub-sample  of  those   14 
willing to delay receipt no clear patterns arise for the various “discount rates” when 
we slice the data by employment category (figure 9).  
 
IV.2 Regression results 
We  begin  with  simple  probit  regressions  estimating  the  probability  to  be  in  an 
informal job. All salaried employees whose job is not registered and all self-employed 
whose activity is not registered are considered informal and assigned the value 1. We 
use four variables for risk attitudes; the general risk measure that can take values 
between 0 and 10 and the general risk indicator that is assigned 0 for values of the 
general risk measure between 0 and 5, and 1 for values between 6 and 10. The career 
risk indicator is constructed in a similar way from the career risk measure that also 
can take values between 0 and 10. We thus employ 4 specifications that add to each 
risk variable an identical set of covariates. 
  Virtually in all cases, the regressions in table 3 show very stable marginal 
effects on the covariates employed across the 4 specifications. A person who is ten 
years older than his colleague has a probability to be informal that is 1 percentage 
point lower, while a female worker’s likelihood of being informal is by roughly 2 
percentage points lower than her male counterpart’s likelihood. The latter result is in 
contrast to what is observed in many developing countries where the incidence of 
informality is usually much larger among females, but in line with the findings of 
Lehmann and Pignatti (2007) about the Ukrainian labor market in the years 2003 and 
2004. Being married and having completed university also lowers the probability of 
being  informal  in  a  substantial  way  as  does  higher  household  income.  The  most 
striking effect works through the labor market since workers with a non-employment 
spell between 2004 and 2007 have a far higher likelihood to find themselves in an 
informal job or activity.    15 
  The coefficients on all risk variables are significant at conventional levels and 
have a positive sign. The coefficients on the risk indicators, which are particularly 
easy to interpret, imply that a person professing to take risky actions in general and in 
career matters has a probability to be informal that is about 2 percentage points higher 
than a person stating to be relatively risk averse.  
  How important are risk attitudes in the determination of informality relative to 
other factors? Another way to highlight the relative importance of the explanatory 
variables is to perform beta regressions. We, therefore, estimate a linear probability 
model. We present its coefficients and also coefficients on standardized coefficients 
(i.e. beta coefficients). The beta regressions show by how many fractions the standard 
deviation  of  the  dependent  variable  is  changed  by  an  increase  of  the  independent 
variable  by  one  standard  deviation.  This  normalization  allows  us  to  compare  the 
relative importance of each determinant of informality. In table 4 the coefficients of 
the  linear  probability  model  and  in  brackets  the  coefficients  of  the  standardized 
explanatory variables, the beta coefficients, are reported. These coefficients show that 
risk  plays  a  role  as  important  as  age,  having  completed  university  and  household 
income,  while  being  female  and  married  plays  a  slightly  bigger  role.  The  most 
important factor determining informality is clearly a previous non-employment spell, 
being about two and a half times more important than risk attitudes. Whatever the 
relative importance of risk attitudes may be, and we have shown that they are as 
important  as  some  central  demographic  characteristics,  risk  attitudes  remain  an 
important predictor of informality even when we control for many variables. 
  Time  preferences,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  seem  to  have  any  predictive 
power, at least with the measure constructed by us. We employ a dummy variable 
taking the value 1 for immediate and the value 0 for delayed consumption. Adding   16 
this variable to the set of regressors in table 3, we find no significance for this proxy 
of time preferences and, therefore, do not report the results here.
4 
  Since we have detailed information on the type of employment we can divide 
the set of the employed in 5 mutually exclusive groups: (1) formal employees, (2) 
involuntary informal employees, (3) voluntary informal employees, (4) formal self-
employed and (5) informal self-employed. Using the same set of covariates and risk 
variables as in tables 3 and 4, we can thus estimate the probability of a person to be in 
one of the states using multinomial logit models. For each risk variable we present 
separate results in tables 5 – 8, where the shown coefficients are relative odds ratios 
with respect to the probability of being a formal employee. 
  Table  5  which  has  the  general  risk  measure  as  our  risk  variable  provides 
interesting evidence regarding the other covariates in the model. Being Ukrainian or 
female  or  married  lowers  the  likelihood  of  being  informally  self-employed  in  a 
substantial fashion. Being married also lowers the likelihood of being an involuntary 
informal  employee  as  does  the  completion  of  university  education.  Previous  non-
employment ratios dramatically raise the odds ratios for all the employment states but 
formal self-employment: a non-employment spell in the period 2004 to 2007 more 
than triples the likelihood to be a voluntary or involuntary informal employed and 
more  than  doubles  the  likelihood  of  being  an  informal  self-employed.  Finally, 
household income nearly doubles the relative odds to be in formal self-employment 
and lowers the probability to be an involuntary informal employee. In table 6 where 
we use the general risk indicator as our risk variable produces very similar results 
with respect to the mentioned covariates. 
  The general risk measure raises the relative probabilities to be formally or 
informally self-employed or to be a voluntary informal employee, with formal self-
                                                 
4 These results are available from the authors on request.   17 
employment  showing  the  strongest  effect.  General  risk  attitudes  do  not  affect  the 
relative probability of being an involuntary informal employee, a result that confirms 
our priors. In other words, since involuntary informal employees have non-registered 
jobs against their will their general risk attitudes should not heighten the likelihood of 
being in an informal job relative to the likelihood of being in a formal job. When we 
use the general risk indicator (table 6) risk strongly affects formal and informal self-
employment. Turning to the career risk measures (tables 7 and 8), we get very similar 
effects of the other covariates on the relative odds to be in a particular state. The 
career risk measure produces positive and significant relative effects only for formal 
self-employment and involuntary informal employees, where this  effect is slightly 
higher for the latter category. The career risk indicator in turn produces effects that 
reverse this order but gives qualitatively identical results.          18 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1 
General risk measure for all respondents
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Figure 2 
General risk by employment category
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Figure 3 
General Risk Attitudes, informal vs formal
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Figure 4 
General risk and informal employees
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Figure 5 
Risk in career matters, all respondents
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Figure 6 
Risk in career matters by employment category
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Figure 7 
Career risk attitudes, informal vs formal
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Figure 8 
Time preferences of all respondents
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Figure 9 
Time preference by employment categories
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Self-employed 1/
Average of Risk Index N Average of Risk Index N Average of Risk Index N
All 4.634 298 3.692 2725 4.786 379
Gender
Men 5.325 166 4.334 1332 5.192 214
Women 3.765 132 3.078 1393 4.261 165
Age Group
15-25 5.302 96 4.575 388 5.237 38
26-35 5.256 78 4.139 583 5.250 76
36-45 3.887 62 3.557 687 4.817 120
46-55 3.467 45 3.097 725 4.330 106
56-65 3.692 13 3.544 283 4.935 31
65+ 4.250 4 3.068 59 3.250 8
Education 3/
High School 4.159 69 3.710 455 4.613 75
University 5.125 24 3.995 646 5.600 65
Married
Yes 3.741 135 3.537 1811 4.792 255
No 5.374 163 4.002 921 4.774 124
Kids  4/
Yes  4.237 97 3.586 1064 4.576 139
No 5.364 33 3.468 408 4.551 78
Region
Kiev 7.000 10 3.409 154 5.214 14
Center 4.015 65 3.699 667 4.688 96
West 4.745 47 3.911 471 5.684 76
East 4.795 78 3.590 748 4.771 83
South 4.622 98 3.711 685 4.209 110
Registration details 5/
Registered Self-employed … … … … 4.926 162
Not registered Self-employed … … … … 4.702 218
Involuntary informal  4.474 251 … … … …
Voluntary informal  5.489 47 … … … …
Source: Authors' calculations based on Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) 2007. 
Notes:
1/ Self-employed: this category includes self-employed and entrepreneurs/employers from the ULMS.
2/ N: number of observations. 
3/ Completed level.
4/ Kids: kids in household
5/ If the employer does not want to register the employee, this is classified here as "involuntary informal". 
Informal employees Formal employees
Average measures of risk attitudes for informal, formal and self-employed work 
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Table 2 
Self-employed 1/
Average of Risk Index N Average of Risk Index N Average of Risk Index N
All 4.081 259 3.334 2482 4.182 286
Gender
Men 4.454 141 3.740 1214 4.294 177
Women 3.636 118 2.946 1268 4.000 109
Age Group
15-25 4.786 84 4.349 361 4.258 31
26-35 4.375 64 3.963 536 4.617 60
36-45 3.456 57 3.105 636 4.515 97
46-55 3.512 41 2.708 644 3.863 73
56-65 2.300 10 2.870 254 2.810 21
65+ 3.667 3 2.627 51 2.000 4
Education 3/
High School 4.082 61 3.303 396 3.842 57
University 4.682 22 3.910 625 5.618 55
Married
Yes 3.387 124 3.149 1649 4.052 191
No 4.719 135 3.702 831 4.442 95
Kids  4/
Yes  3.778 90 3.252 957 4.182 110
No 5.172 29 2.997 376 3.920 50
Region
Kiev 5.556 9 3.782 147 4.571 14
Center 3.365 63 3.016 618 3.316 76
West 4.158 38 3.400 420 4.627 59
East 4.493 67 3.438 657 4.964 55
South 4.098 82 3.389 640 4.073 82
Registration details 5/
Registered Self-employed … … … … 4.587 138
Not registered Self-employed … … … … 3.810 147
Involuntary informal  3.822 219 … … … …
Voluntary informal  5.500 40 … … … …
Source: Authors' calculations based on Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) 2007. 
Notes:
1/ Self-employed: this category includes self-employed and entrepreneurs/employers from the ULMS.
2/ N: number of observations. 
3/ Completed level.
4/ Kids: kids in household
5/ If the employer does not want to register the employee, this is classified here as "involuntary informal". 
Informal employees Formal employees
Average measures of career risk attitudes for informal, formal and self-employed work 
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Table 3 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
risk 0.004*** … … …
[0.002] … … …
risk indicator … 0.018* … …
… [0.011] … …
career risk … … 0.003** …
… … [0.001] …
career risk indicator … … … 0.022*
… … … [0.012]
age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
ukrainian  -0.014 -0.014 -0.01 -0.009
[0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011]
female -0.021** -0.025** -0.024** -0.025**
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
married -0.051*** -0.053*** -0.036*** -0.036***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013]
kids in household 0.008 0.007 0.002 0.002
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
completed secondary 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.009
[0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
university completed -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.029***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
non-employment (2004-2007) 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.086*** 0.085***
[0.019] [0.019] [0.020] [0.020]
ln household income -0.014** -0.014* -0.012* -0.012*
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
Other controls
Sectors YES YES YES YES
Regions YES YES YES YES
Observations 2429 2429 2183 2183
Pseudo R Squared 0.246 0.243 0.248 0.246
Source: Authors' calculations based on the ULMS 2007.
Standard errors in brackets. Marginal Effects reported.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: all informals (waged employees and self-employed) 1 
and rest of employed (formals) 0. Probability of being informally employed.
Mean Dependent Variable: 0.148
Risk/Career Risk: Risk measure 0-10. 
Risk Indicator/Career Risk Indicator: 0-5 is 0 and 6-10 is 1.
Risk Measures and Informal Labour Market: Probit Regressions
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Table 4 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
risk 0.006*** … … …
[0.053] … … …
risk indicator … 0.024* … …
… [0.034] … …
career risk … … 0.005** …
… … [0.049] …
career risk indicator … … … 0.030**
… … … [0.042]
age -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
[-0.047] [-0.051] [-0.044] [-0.047]
ukrainian  -0.02 -0.021 -0.013 -0.012
[-0.027] [-0.027] [-0.017] [-0.016]
female -0.033** -0.037*** -0.038*** -0.039***
[-0.053] [-0.061] [-0.064] [-0.066]
married -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.051*** -0.052***
[-0.096] [-0.098] [-0.072] [-0.073]
kids in household 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.003
[0.026] [0.025] [0.008] [0.008]
completed secondary 0.01 0.01 0.011 0.011
[0.012] [0.012] [0.014] [0.014]
university completed -0.035** -0.034** -0.036** -0.035**
[-0.047] [-0.046] [-0.050] [-0.050]
non-employment (2004-2007) 0.121*** 0.120*** 0.123*** 0.122***
[0.139] [0.137] [0.144] [0.143]
ln household income -0.019* -0.019* -0.019* -0.020*
[-0.037] [-0.036] [-0.039] [-0.040]
Other controls
Sectors YES YES YES YES
Regions YES YES YES YES
Observations 2429 2429 2183 2183
Source: Authors' calculations based on the ULMS 2007.
Normalized beta coefficients in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent variable: all informals (waged employees and self-employed) 1 
and rest of employed (formals) 0.
Risk: Risk measure 0-10. 
Risk Indicator: 0-5 is 0 and 6-10 is 1.
General Risk and Informal Labour Market: Beta Regressions
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Table 5 
formal informal involuntary informal voluntary informal
self-employed employees employees self-employed
risk 1.143*** 1.065 1.233** 1.121**
[-0.041] [-0.037] [-0.091] [-0.049]
age 0.999 0.982 0.984 0.983
[-0.01] [-0.009] [-0.019] [-0.012]
ukrainian  0.932 1.006 0.89 0.528*
[-0.239] [-0.242] [-0.456] [-0.149]
female 0.731 0.675 1.536 0.403**
[-0.162] [-0.15] [-0.728] [-0.122]
married 0.941 0.497** 0.639 0.399**
[-0.246] [-0.108] [-0.294] [-0.112]
kids in household 1.066 1.209 0.946 1.238
[-0.139] [-0.147] [-0.263] [-0.174]
completed secondary 0.908 1.263 0.937 0.965
[-0.268] [-0.291] [-0.493] [-0.298]
university completed 0.962 0.436* 0.425 0.593
[-0.251] [-0.15] [-0.281] [-0.219]
non-employment (2004-2007) 0.726 3.267*** 3.605** 2.376**
[-0.238] [-0.702] [-1.587] [-0.668]
ln household income 1.971*** 0.664* 1.305 1.039
[-0.365] [-0.11] [-0.481] [-0.226]
Other controls
Sectors
Regions
Observations
Source: Authors' calculations based on the ULMS 2007.
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Relative Odds Ratios
Base Category: formal employees
Risk: Risk measure 0-10. 
2417
Multinomial Logit Regression: Informality and Risk
YES
YES
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Table 6 
formal informal involuntary informal voluntary informal
self-employed employees employees self-employed
risk indicator 2.388*** 1.221 3.022* 1.744*
[-0.519] [-0.269] [-1.306] [-0.451]
age 0.997 0.981* 0.983 0.982
[-0.01] [-0.009] [-0.02] [-0.012]
ukrainian  0.949 1.00 0.896 0.528*
[-0.244] [-0.24] [-0.461] [-0.149]
female 0.711 0.637* 1.393 0.372***
[-0.157] [-0.14] [-0.656] [-0.111]
married 0.953 0.484*** 0.64 0.391***
[-0.25] [-0.105] [-0.295] [-0.109]
kids in household 1.045 1.204 0.932 1.239
[-0.137] [-0.146] [-0.257] [-0.174]
completed secondary 0.904 1.267 0.911 0.952
[-0.267] [-0.292] [-0.48] [-0.294]
university completed 0.901 0.443* 0.423 0.589
[-0.238] [-0.153] [-0.281] [-0.218]
non-employment (2004-2007) 0.678 3.247*** 3.360** 2.298**
[-0.224] [-0.699] [-1.486] [-0.647]
ln household income 1.976*** 0.668* 1.285 1.045
[-0.365] [-0.11] [-0.47] [-0.227]
Other controls
Sectors
Regions
Observations
Source: Authors' calculations based on the ULMS 2007.
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Relative Odds Ratios
Base Category: formal employees
Risk Indicator: 0-5 is 0 and 6-10 is 1.
YES
2417
Multinomial Logit Regression: Informality and Risk Indicator
YES
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Table 7 
formal informal involuntary informal voluntary informal
self-employed employees employees self-employed
career risk 1.126** 1.044 1.328*** 1.084
[-0.041] [-0.037] [-0.109] [-0.052]
age 1.001 0.982 0.991 0.984
[-0.011] [-0.01] [-0.023] [-0.013]
ukrainian  0.91 0.91 0.958 0.717
[-0.251] [-0.228] [-0.598] [-0.242]
female 0.635 0.643 1.451 0.291***
[-0.15] [-0.148] [-0.781] [-0.104]
married 0.861 0.626* 0.812 0.386**
[-0.24] [-0.146] [-0.447] [-0.125]
kids in household 1.028 1.011 0.764 1.297
[-0.15] [-0.139] [-0.265] [-0.201]
completed secondary 0.954 1.386 0.742 0.916
[-0.303] [-0.33] [-0.498] [-0.315]
university completed 0.954 0.439* 0.397 0.567
[-0.264] [-0.158] [-0.279] [-0.242]
non-employment (2004-2007) 0.721 3.326*** 3.867** 2.413**
[-0.257] [-0.747] [-1.989] [-0.773]
ln household income 2.126*** 0.649* 2.287 1.023
[-0.427] [-0.113] [-0.992] [-0.251]
Other controls
Sectors
Regions
Observations
Source: Authors' calculations based on the ULMS 2007.
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Relative Odds Ratios
Base Category: formal employees
Career Risk: Risk measure 0-10. 
YES
Multinomial Logit Regression: Informality and Career Risk
YES
2171
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   32 
Table 8 
formal informal involuntary informal voluntary informal
self-employed employees employees self-employed
career risk indicator 2.442*** 1.189 5.334*** 1.793
[-0.577] [-0.289] [-2.697] [-0.553]
age 1.000 0.980* 0.986 0.983
[-0.011] [-0.01] [-0.023] [-0.013]
ukrainian  0.916 0.918 0.951 0.723
[-0.253] [-0.23] [-0.59] [-0.244]
female 0.64 0.627* 1.453 0.293***
[-0.151] [-0.145] [-0.781] [-0.105]
married 0.85 0.619* 0.797 0.385**
[-0.237] [-0.145] [-0.437] [-0.125]
kids in household 1.022 1.004 0.73 1.29
[-0.15] [-0.138] [-0.254] [-0.2]
completed secondary 0.964 1.388 0.727 0.921
[-0.306] [-0.33] [-0.487] [-0.318]
university completed 0.927 0.445* 0.409 0.561
[-0.257] [-0.16] [-0.288] [-0.239]
non-employment (2004-2007) 0.701 3.315*** 3.629* 2.356**
[-0.25] [-0.745] [-1.862] [-0.757]
ln household income 2.117*** 0.651* 2.274 1.025
[-0.424] [-0.113] [-0.985] [-0.25]
Other controls
Sectors
Regions
Observations
Source: Authors' calculations based on the ULMS 2007.
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Relative Odds Ratios
Base Category: formal employees
Career Risk Indicator: 0-5 is 0 and 6-10 is 1.
Multinomial Logit Regression: Informality and Career Risk Indicator
YES
YES
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